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Abstract
Stories about women activism in the Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia has gained
scholarly attention. The existing literatures, however, tend to focus on the official dis-
courses. This article discusses female members’ everyday experiences within the the liqo
activity, as part of the Tarbiyah movement (circle of religious teaching). It examines the
extent to which liqo members experience, receive, and practice the da’wa ideology
designed by the Tarbiyah movement. It focuses on cadres’ stories about the lived
experiences they have had through joining the liqo, with special reference to the female
liqo group in Jakarta. Using ethnographic approach, data were collected through in-depth
interviews with 26 female liqo members from a total of 45 interviewees and 15 observa-
tions of the liqo sessions. The study concludes that although the official form of religiosity,
piety and political identity have been promoted by the Tarbiyah movement and its leaders,
the experiences and practices of women revealed a heterogeneity and complexity of
meanings of being in the liqo. This study attempts to contribute to the existing analysis
of the da’wa (Islamic preaching and mission) and politics of a contemporary female
Islamist movement with a case study of the Indonesian Tarbiyah movement.
Keywords Liqo . Tarbiyahmovement . da’wa .Women . Islamism
Introduction
Islamism is a modern political ideology that emerged as a new phenomenon during the
twentieth century (Roy 2004; Mandaville 2007, 2014). Islamism is a response to the
formation of secular nation-states that emerged in postcolonial Muslim countries,
replacing the Islamic dynasty and Islamic imperium in the period after Western
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colonialism (Mandaville 2007). Thus, Islamism is a direct political response to the
specific context of encounter with Western modernity (Mandaville 2007, 2014). Con-
flict between Islam and the West has been a defining response to modernity for many
Islamist movements and thinkers. In the Twentieth century, Islamist movements came
to represent ideological opposition to the influence of other Western ‘isms’, such as
liberalism, Zionism, and secularism. One concept that has been particularly important
in articulating this Islamist critique of the impact of modernity is ghazwul fikri (‘the
invasion of ideas’) (Hirschkind 2009).
For Islamist movements, the increasing global hegemony of Western culture (as well
as its continuing economic and political power) is believed to have undermined Islamic
culture. Islamists have argued that Western cultural hegemony has attacked Islam and
Muslim lives through the mass-media, popular culture such as films and music, and the
secular education system (Hirschkind 2009). Islamist activists typically present da’wa
(Islamic preaching and mission) as a necessity tools to counter the ‘dangerous’ cultural
imperialism of the West. Da’wa is seen to be a crucial process to raise consciousness
among Muslim on how they can overturn the situation through a religio-political
revival. Islamist movement does not only focus on disciplining the self through da’wa
focused on individual piety, but also (eventually) on creating and controlling public
piety via public da’wa.1 This individual piety and public piety have been developed
through the da’wa of the Tarbiyah movement/PKS in Indonesia.
The Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia has been widely studied by previous scholars
(Asyari and Abid 2016; Woodward et al. 2013; Hidayat 2012; Hamayotsu 2011; Hilmy
2010; Platzdasch 2009; Permata 2008). These studies have shown that the discussion
are primarily based on official, formal and political party leaders’ discourses, resulting
in the omission of internal variations within the movement, especially in terms of
ordinary members’ experiences. In particular, there has been no sufficient research on
the concept and ideology of the da’wa of the weekly liqo sessions as the core da’wa
activity of the Tarbiyah movement.2 There are some studies looking at the involvement
of women in this Islamist movement (Arimbi 2017; Afrianty 2015; Rinaldo 2008a, b, c,
2013). These works generally discuss women’s role in the movement, their political
expressions in public life and how they make connections with other Islamic move-
ments. However, such research has paid little attention to ordinary female members’
experiences and discourses in the liqo. In this article, my attempt is to look at the
involvement of ordinary women in the Islamist da’wa movement and their lived
experiences in the liqo.
The research question I seek to discuss in this article is how female liqo members
experience the weekly da’wa session, especially on theme about private religiosity or
1 By ‘individual piety’ here scholars typically mean the commitment to perform obligatory rituals such as the
five-times-daily-prayers, reciting the Qur’an, fasting in the month of Ramadan, giving alms, and dressing and
behaving in an ‘Islamic’ way. Strengthening individual piety, for the Islamist, is not only an obligation for
Muslims, but also aims to protect them from being influenced by Western modernity. The concept of public
piety also implies that there may be (often highly contested) attempts at the regulation and standardisation of
practices that are regarded by particular constituencies as appropriately ‘pious’.
2 The liqowas also called halaqah (Arabic for religious circle). The term liqo (meeting) and halaqah (religious
circle) refer to the same weekly religious mentoring developed for the purpose of teaching the religious
doctrine and ideology of the Tarbiyah movement. Although the term halaqah is mainly used in the Tarbiyah
movement’s official books, I prefer to use the term liqo because my observations and interviews revealed that
it is more widely used by the liqo community than the term halaqah.
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piety and political identity. I argue that the lived experiences of the female liqo are
heterogeneous and complex. Their motivations for joining and become member of liqo
are not only to improve their religiosity and piety, but also to expand their social
networks such as to find new friends, strengthen existing friendships, and as an
expression of obedience to their husbands who are mostly movement members or
party functionaries. The liqo itself is created by the Tarbiyah movement leaders as part
of its da’wa ideology. Leaders of the Tarbiyah movement is not merely seeking to
strengthen its members’ da’wa ideologies but also to develop their commitments and
contributions to the party (PKS). Thus, lessons conveyed at the liqo lessons do not only
consist of religious content to improve the members’ knowledge of Islam, but also
political messages to strengthen their political identity and loyalty to the party. Apart
from lessons of aqidah (belief) and ibadah (worship), the lesson of ghazwul fikri
(ideological conquest) is taught during the liqo sessions. The concept of ghazwul fikri
is perceived by the mentors and trainees as a ‘soft’ cultural war that is carried out by
Western countries (European and American) with the purpose of defeating Muslims.
This lesson is taught and promoted to the female members as the teaching that dividing
the world into friends and enemies of Islam.
The first section of this article explains the theoretical background of this article such
as the concept of lived religion and how it has been used to analyse women religious
movement. It will be followed by a discussion on the emergence of the Tarbiyah
movement in Indonesia and its relationship with the liqo and the PKS. The third section
discusses women’s liqo group activisms based on my fieldwork I did in 2013 and 2017.
In this section I will discuss female cadres’s view on their conversion to the liqo and the
motivation that brought them to join the liqo circle. In the last section the article
explores how female members of liqo perceive the religious teachings and political
ideology of the liqo which include ghazwul fikri (invasion of idea), aqidah (beliefs),
ibadah (worship), and adab (ethics).
This research is based on an ethnographic approach. I employed qualitative
methods of data gathering, particularly in-depth interviews and participant obser-
vation during my fieldwork in Jakarta that I conducted twice in 2013 and 2017. In
order to elicit diverse responses and perspectives on lived experiential discourses, I
interviewed forty-five participants from a range of different positions in the liqo-
Tarbiyah movement’s hierarchy.3 Ten can be classified as past and present leaders
of the liqo (top rank), twelve were mentors or murabbi of the liqo that trained the
trainees in the weekly sessions (middle rank), twelve were trainees or mutarabbi
who regularly joined the liqo sessions (lower rank), nine were public scholars who
have been engaged with the Tarbiyah movement discourses and two ex-liqo trainees
who have now left the liqo and became outsiders. Of the total forty-five partici-
pants, twenty-six were female and nineteen were male. The profile of these partic-
ipants had confirmed my reviews to the written resources on the movement and the
broader literature on global and local Islamism that the activists of almost all the
Islamist da’wa movements are typically young graduates from non-religious edu-
cational backgrounds who were attracted towards studying Islam (Mandaville 2007;
Roy 2004; Machmudi 2006; Damanik 2002).
3 All the participants’ names have been changed to preserve confidentiality.
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Most of the observations took place in Jakarta during the Jakarta governor election
in 2017. I successfully attended about fifteen liqomeetings after I managed to approach
the key figure in the movement. He granted me access to attend the da’wa activities
because I am a female Indonesian Muslim who graduated from Al-Azhar University
Cairo - the same university where he received his bachelor’s degree. During my
attendance at a liqo group, I observed how the lessons were delivered by the mentor,
and how they were received and the extent to which they were put into practice by the
trainees. Each meeting ran for a length of 2 to 4 hours in the trainees’ (mutarabbi)
homes. The observations were more difficult than the interviews in terms of ap-
proaching people and gaining their trust through attending their ‘exclusive’ weekly
liqo. During my fieldwork, I also attended a range of PKS da’wa training events
(daurah), which included: a) daurah (training) on ‘the evaluation of the Jakarta
governor election’, b) daurah on Islamic entrepreneurship and Islamic economy, and
3) daurah on Islamic leadership.4 Apart from the weekly liqo and daurah sessions, I
spent time interacting with the trainees outside these sessions as well, such as I
responded to their invitation to join their daily and non-formal activities such as visiting
a female member who was hospitalized and visiting a sick family member (son) of a
female trainee. These visit helped me in understanding their background, everyday
feelings and experiences of these women.
Everyday lived religion and women in religious movements
The everyday aspects of the women in the liqo of the Tarbiyah movement can be
explained with reference to the concept of lived religion. This relates especially to the
experience of women involved in pious movements such as the women in the liqo
which is still framed by the more formal religious and political agendas designed by the
leaders of the formal political party, the PKS. A key argument of this article is that the
lived experiences of ordinary members is neglected in previous studies of the Tarbiyah
movement/PKS. Reviewing the literature on contemporary Islamic movements, I saw
the importance of providing a more balanced perspective on official discourses about
da’wa by researching the more informal lived experiences of members.5 The intention
of this article is not to reject the findings and conclusions of studies concerned with
formal, official, and institutionalised forms of da’wa, but to look at them together with a
4 The daurah is one of the religious programmes run by the PKS under the umbrella of the Tarbiyah
movement. The daurah programme also relates to the liqo, as both are used for spreading the Tarbiyah
messages of da’wa. This is shown by the lessons in the daurah and liqo, which are mixed together in one
manual book, calledManhaj Tarbiyah (2003, 2005). During my observation, however, I discovered that these
two programmes have differences, especially in terms of their audiences and lessons. The audiences taught
through the daurah are larger than those of the liqo. The audience of the daurah can also be of mixed gender,
including both male and female Tarbiyah activists, and there are no limitations about which members (all
levels in the liqo) can attend. The daurah lessons also cover larger and more up-to-date materials and agendas,
including issues arising in the elections, other political discourses, and developing members’ skills. Thus,
daurah can be seen as being more concerned with issues relating to public life than the liqo is.
5 Other scholars also recognized the growing focus on the practices of religion in everyday life, which is
becoming increasingly attractive in the broader field of the social sciences (see Hunt 2014; Kersten 2014;
Jeldtoft 2011; Devine and Deneulin 2011). They explored the ‘everyday’ religion from various perspectives
and different contexts such as Schielke, S & Debevec, L. (eds.), 2012.
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study of informal everyday lived da’wa and to describe and analyse some of the
tensions therein. The aim is thus to provide a more balance and complete picture of
this Islamist da’wa movement in Indonesia from the perspectives of members’ ‘every-
day’ and ‘lived religion’.
Among the pioneers of the concept of ‘everyday’ and ‘lived religion’ in the
sociology of religion are Nancy T. Ammerman and Meredith McGuire. Neither has
been concerned with the study of Muslim societies. Nevertheless, not unlike the
Anthropology of Islam, Ammerman (2014) points out that studying the perceptions
of members of organisations aims to listen to their daily experiences. For
Ammerman, researching the everyday means privileging “the experience of non-
experts” (2007:5). Thus the perspective of lived religion helps researchers to build
an understanding of the multi-layered nature of religious movements and the
everyday realities of its members (Ammerman 2014). In line with Ammerman’s
argument, Berglund (2014), who has studies Muslims in Europe, also highlights
that discussing only official discourses presents Islamic movements as stereotypical
monolithic institutions, with all who belong to such movements having the same
perspectives and attitudes. Everyday religion has been characterized by researchers
as privatized religion and spirituality (Bellah et al. 1996; Heelas and Woodhead
2005; Hamberg 2009). Spirituality is ‘often characterized as individualistic, prag-
matic and with a strong focus on autonomy and the personal experience as opposed
to religious authority and fixed traditions’ (Jeldtoft 2011:1137).
Sociologist of religion McGuire invokes the concept of ‘lived religion’ in her work,
Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life, to research “religion as expressed
and experienced in the lives of individuals” (2008:3). McGuire (2008:11) has suggested
one way of looking at everyday forms of religion, which focuses on the religiosity of
individuals. She aims to distinguish “the actual experience of religious persons from the
prescribed religion of institutionally defined beliefs and practices”, focusing on religion
“as practiced, experienced and expressed by ordinary people” (McGuire 2008:12).
Lived religion as explained by Ammerman and McGuire is, in particular, the embodied
and enacted forms of religion and spirituality that occur in everyday life. Dwelling on
women’s experiences, McGuire argues that religiosity and gender self-identity are
expressed and transformed in an ongoing process of mind-body-spirit practice. She
shows that “concrete body practices are involved in how gendered selves are socially
developed, maintained, and changed throughout life” (McGuire 2008:182).
Thus, gender roles and identities in society are reproduced (and contested) in large
part through the enactment of norms through bodily practices. These practices are
defined by making sense in everyday life while at the same time contributing to the
production of people’s identities and sense of belonging (McGuire 2008:46). Thus,
modern religious groups often ask their members to commit to developing “new”
selves in related ways (no matter how this process is understood –for instance as
‘spirituality’, ‘healing’, ‘conversion’, etc): “all religious groups (at least for some
members) promote a measure of transformation of self toward a spiritual ideal”
(2008:172). McGuire gives examples of movements requiring members to wear uni-
form clothing, assume certain gestures and so on to diminish the old or affirm the new
self. So, for many who join a religious movement and desire or experience such
personal transformation, new religious and spiritual practices may also be key pathways
to new gender roles and literally becoming a new kind of person.
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As McGuire (2008) puts in her book “Lived Religion”, individuals’ religious
experiences, expressions, and practices are complex and dynamic.6 Schielke and
Debevec (2012) also recognize that, ‘the everyday practice of religion is multifarious,
ambivalent, and frequently incongruous’. I agree with McGuire that “at the level of
individual, religion is not fixed, unitary, or even coherent” (2008:12), and this means
that it is impossible to understand individuals’ religiosity and identity based only upon
the official viewpoint of the organisations of which they are members. Hence, the
challenge is to illuminate how individuals and social groups make sense of the
complexities of everyday life and what the significance of religious beliefs and
practices in different settings and contexts (Hunt 2014).
Mahmood’s (2005) study of the women’s mosque movement in Egypt shows its
relevance with my study that being pious means adherence to norms of religiosity
especially through the performance of acts of worship (ibadah), attention to Islamic
dress and other ways of practicing Muslim self-identity. However, McGuire’s work
tends to focus on Western women and more individualistic forms of lived religion and
spirituality at some distance from official religion. Paying more attention to the
relationship between the latter and the former in the context of Muslim societies, Saba
Mahmood’s (2005) work, Politics of Piety; the Islamic Revival and the Feminist
Subject, studies women in the mosque movement in modern Egypt, taking inspiration
from debates about performativity in Feminist studies and applying them to the
Anthropology of Islam (cf. Butler 1997; Asad 1986). The women she studied seek to
transform themselves by donning more modest dress and more concealing veils, by
praying frequently, by attending all-female religious sessions in mosques where they
are exhorted to adhere to Qur’anic teachings and to act in line with the will of Allah.
According to these Egyptian women, the performance of ritualized behavior is one
among a continuum of practices that serve as the necessary means to the realization of a
pious self.7 Thus, disciplining and training their bodies through everyday practices is
considered as the most effective way to transform their identity. Compared to
McGuire’s study on women in mixed and ‘unofficial’ religious contexts within the
context of liberal America, Mahmood’s ethnographic account of the lives of pious
Salafi-oriented women in contemporary Egypt is closer to my study of the Tarbiyah
women. Thus, this study explores and reveals the da’wa ideologies and practices within
the liqo of the Tarbiyah movement as they understood, experienced and performed by
its female members.
The emergence of Liqo and its relationship with Tarbiyah movement
and PKS
Although according to leaders of this movement it emerged in 1983, the history of the
Tarbiyah Movement is actually can be traced back to 1968, when the Indonesian
6 McGuire uses the term ‘lived religion’ for “distinguishing the actual experiences of religious persons from
[the] prescribed religion of institutionally defined beliefs and practices” (2008:12). She highlights the idea that
an “individual’s lived religion is experienced and expressed in everyday practices – concrete ways of engaging
their bodies and emotions in being religious” (2008: 208).
7 Mahmood (2005)‘s performativity has also used to understand the Tablighi Jama’at women in Indonesia and
its self-transformation to be pious women (see Amrullah 2011).
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Islamic Da’wa Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) focused their
efforts on da’wa programs in university campuses through a program called Bina
Masjid Kampus (Campus-Mosque Building) and organised da’wa training called
Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD).8 During the 1970s and 1980s, students interested
in religious mentoring or training actively held informal small study circles, called liqo
or halaqah. Most circles were held in mosques located in ‘secular’ universities such as
the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and The Bogor Institute of Agriculture
(IPB).9 These were the starting points and epicentres of the Tarbiyah Movement. The
liqo were initially focused on improving the private piety of individuals but they also
attempted to develop more public agendas to Islamise society and the state.
The Tarbiyah movement emerged during a period of the state repression of Islamists.
In the late 1970s, the New Order regime attempted to restrict Islamic groups from
having public political roles.10 The regime also prohibited students from holding
religious teaching and da’wa sessions in the public sphere. As a result of such
government policy, the da’wa activities of both Islamic groups and leaders went
‘underground’. Under the later period of Soeharto’s rule (who ruled from 1966 to
1998), there were also movements and figures that promoted and spread liberal Islam
such as gerakan pembaharuan or the ‘renewal movement’ which was led by
Nurcholish Madjid (‘Cak Nur’). Through this movement, he rejected primordial
Muslim politics with his famous slogan “Islam yes, Partai Islam, no!”. Other figures
are Gusdur, who, with his traditionalist background, influenced many younger gener-
ations of NU with his liberal Islam, and Munawir Syadzali (a former Minister of
Religious Affairs), who, with his “re-actualisation” agenda, emphasized the need for
contextual interpretation of Quranic verses. These ‘liberal’ ideas were rejected in
former Masyumi circles by activists who later became key leaders of DDII (Saleh
2004; Platzdasch 2009). These ideas were not acceptable to the Tarbiyah Movement
and led them to keep struggling against such ideas through their da’wa activities,
mainly through the liqo.
Islamism emerged more visibly in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s, through the
Tarbiyah movement and other competing Islamist movements. This was also a decade
of very public re-Islamisation of Muslim public spheres worldwide, for example in
terms of events such as the Iranian revolution (1979) and the Afghan jihad against the
Russians, as well as the global spread of Wahhabi and Salafi ideology through Saudi-
sponsored organisations and publications (Meijer 2009; Mandaville 2007/2014;
Wiktorowicz 2006; Burgat 2003). Apart from this context, the emergence of the
Tarbiyah Movement was also influenced by the ideologies of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) that travelled to Indonesia through the translated works of its
founders and ideologues. The ideologies of the MB were also promoted and
8 The DDII founded and led by Natsir (previously leader of Masyumi). Natsir provided an infrastructure for
university students to manage their religious teaching and da’wa activism (see Kahin 2012).
9 The Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia, like Islamism in other countries, emerged and grew mainly in big
cities as a response to social change and emerging political opportunities (cf. Wiktorowicz 2004; Fox 2012).
Campus mosques in secular universities became the central hub of this activism with the main activity being
the weekly study circle (liqo or halaqah).
10 The regime banned theMasyumi, considering it as having an agenda for formalising shari’a that challenged
the modern secular nation-state and issued the policy of NKK (Nomalisasi Kehidupan Kampus or Normal-
isation of campus lives) (see Effendyi 2003).
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disseminated by the Middle Eastern graduates who later became elites of the Tarbiyah
Movement, such as Salim Segaf and Hidayat Nur Wahid.
The Tarbiyah movement then developed and consolidated when Soeharto sought to
recognise Islamic organisations in the public sphere in an effort to shore up his
legitimacy during the final period of his government – from 1989 to 1998. The
changing political climate and a more democratic state in the post-New Order era from
the end of 1998 encouraged the emergence in the public sphere of various revivalist
Islamic groups11 and new Islamic political parties based on revivalist ideologies.12 In
this context, the emergence of a democratic state was also seen by the Tarbiyah
movement as an opportunity for strengthening and expanding its da’wa movement
beyond the private to the public sphere and the state domain. Therefore, they
established a formal political party named the Justice Party or Partai Keadilan (PK)
in Jakarta in 1998. Then, they changed its name into The Prosperous and Justice Party
or Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in 2004 (see Machmudi 2006; Damanik 2002).13
The decision to establish the party caused the Tarbiyah movement’s orientation to
combine a focus on strengthening the individual piety of its cadres and more actively
attracting wider constituencies. Since the 2004 general election, in particular, the party
has attempted to attract wider audiences by campaigning on ‘secular’ social justice
issues (Platzdasch 2009). It has focused more on education for poor people, anti-
corruption and clean governance, instead of the formalisation of shari’a (Islamic law)
and the other Islamic identity issues that were central to their campaign in the previous
election (1999) (Permata 2008; Muhtadi 2012). The party even declared itself to be a
pluralist party by accommodating non-Muslim members and promoting them as
candidates for parliament (Platzdasch 2009).14 This ‘shifting’ political pragmatism
disappointed some of the cadres of the Tarbiyah movement and has led to internal
debates and tensions between key figures. According to Permata (2008, 2013) these
disappointment and tension happened because the mixed between two different char-
acters of organisations; the Tarbiyah movement which is more religiously purist and
informal, and the party which is more pragmatic and formal.
I argue that the interests and goals of the Tarbiyah movement and the party (PKS)
are, to some degree, intertwined. The Tarbiyah movement is still focused on strength-
ening the individual piety of its members, but it has started to become involved in
mobilising the members of the movement to support the party’s goal. Therefore, the
da’wa of the Tarbiyah movement after the establishment of the party (including the
liqo), has a mixed focus on both developing individual piety and mobilising the cadres
for more formal political purposes, such as recruiting party cadres, disseminating party
policies, and involving members in electoral grassroots campaign for gaining political
11 Such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI), and the Forum of
Communication of Ahlussunnah Wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ) (see Hilmy 2010; Hasan 2012; Jamhari and
Jahroni 2004)
12 The Crescent Moon Party (PBB) and New Masyumi Party) were founded following the liberalisation of the
Indonesian political system, which guaranteed people’s rights to establish parties and social organisations (see
Platzdasch 2009; Mietzner 2009).
13 The PK “rebranded’ and changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in 2004 because as the PK
it had failed to meet the electoral threshold requiring all parties to get more than 2% of national votes. In the
1999 election, the PK only got 1.7%.
14 We can also see this attempt in the case of the MB in Egypt who accommodated Christians. The MB has
also formed electoral alliances with nationalists, secularists and liberals (see Leiken and Brooke 2007).
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positions in the parliament, government and other public positions. Due to its present
position as a political party within a democratic state, the PKS has publicly adopted
pragmatic policies on religious pluralism, human rights and so on. These commitments
have displaced the party’s commitment to establishing shari’a governance – something
that the Tarbiyah community has sought since its outset. This recalls Wiktorowicz’s
(2006) distinction (and tensions) between (Salafi) ‘politicos’ and ‘purists’. For instance,
in the liqo, I saw how the trainees expressed their ‘disappointment’ at being required to
participate in the ‘grassroots’ election campaigning process. This turned them into
‘human resources’ who devoted their time to simple practical tasks for the party (such
as handing out pamphlets), rather than the lessons of the liqo. As a result, the Tarbiyah
female members actively involved in the weekly liqo sessions have found themselves
in a dilemma. On the one hand, they have to be committed to being assertive on the
importance of Islamising individuals, whilst on the other they have become subordinate
to the political interests of the party.
A female Liqo group in Jakarta
Each liqo is a small training cluster consisting of six to ten trainees held under the
supervision of a mentor or trainer. As the liqo lessons (mawad [pl.], madah [sing.])
revolve around Tarbiyah ideology, the trainee of the liqo is called a mutarabbi (a male
trainee) or mutarabbiah (a female trainee), while the mentor or trainer is called a
murabbi (a male mentor) or murabbiah (a female mentor). The liqo is designed for
single gender classes, with male and female liqo groups being segregated. Gender
segregation is typical of almost all da’wa movements among modern Islamists.15 An
interview with a senior mentor in Pondok Aren-Tangerang revealed that liqo mentors
are advised to recruit trainees from their neighbourhood areas. Arifin added that all
trainees in his liqo group live in Pondok Aren or Ciputat – two districts that are very
close to each other.16 This guideline aims to make it easier for both trainers and trainees
to attend their routine meetings. The liqo sessions are conducted every week, with the
day and time of the sessions being discussed and chosen by the trainees (mutarabbi) in
conjunction with the mentor (murabbi) of each liqo group based on their availability.
However, sessions are commonly arranged for weekends, as the majority of both
trainees and trainers are young working men and women. The liqo is scheduled to last
2 hours, and can be run in the morning, afternoon, or evening, again depending on each
group’s preferences.
Although the official texts stipulate that the liqo sessions must remain small to allow
intensive learning and indoctrination, together with routine individual assessment of the
trainees by their mentors (DPP PKS 2005), in reality this depends on each situation and
each mentor. The officialManhaj Tarbiyah book says that each liqo group should hold
six-ten trainees, but the trainees and mentors that I interviewed told me that the number
of trainees in a group is not always in this range. For instance, four liqo mentors said
15 These include Al-Muhajirun in the UK (Wiktorowicz 2005), Salafis and the MB in Jordan (Wiktorowicz
2001), the mosque or piety movement in Egypt (Mahmood 2005), and the Hizb al-Tahrir (Taji-Farouki 1996).
16 Pondok Aren and Ciputat are two districts in the city of South Tangerang in Indonesia. Both districts




that the number of trainees in their groups varies between eight-twelve. Ridho, one of
male mentor who leads a liqo group in the district of Bekasi, says: ‘In regard to the
restriction issue, I think it is hard to restrict the number of liqo trainees when there are
many requests to join. As they want to learn about Islam from us, it is difficult for us
[mentors] to reject them’. Ranti, another female mentor said that she is flexible about
the number of trainees that she accepts in a liqo group when it is formed because three
to five trainees usually drop out after the liqo meetings have run for a few weeks as
their commitment is not strong enough. My interviews suggested that this often
happens, as individuals do not know exactly what the lessons given in the liqo involve
until they experience them.17 Nevertheless, the small number of trainees per group
produced by the restrictions on liqo group size are broadly adhered to, and enable
mentors and trainees to pass on and receive liqo messages effectively.18 Rahima, a
young female mentor, argues that:
The liqo is different from other pengajian (religious learning or lecturing groups)
such as Majelis Ta’lim, particularly in terms of its audience and its effective-
ness.19 The Majelis Ta’lim is attended by more than 20 people, so it tends to be
one-way speaking. Unlike the Majelis Ta’lim, the audience of the liqo is very
limited, to an audience of about 6 to 10 persons. This causes the learning
conditions [to be] more effective and interactive. It means that the study is not
a one-way process in which the audience are discouraged to ask and express their
ideas. In a small group, the audience are more comfortable in asking questions.
The mentors are also encouraged to stimulate the audience to raise questions and
to be involved in a discussion.
My observations of the women’s liqo group that I joined shown that liqo groups
typically consist of trainees and a mentor from a local neighbourhood area. During
my observations, I was allocated by my respondent (a female senior mentor or
murabbiyah) to a liqo cluster whose members were comprised of people from a
neighbourhood in the district of Pondok Aren, near Jakarta. In its first session, my liqo
group was composed of nine women within an age range of approximately 26–
42 years.20 However, two of the group left after the first two liqo sessions.21 The initial
group was made up of seven married women, who all had children, and two unmarried
women. Five of the trainees were working women, three were housewives, and one
17 To me, this seems to represent a kind of da’wa strategy, which I refer to as ‘da’wa by deception’, as the
activists try to influence the people they are approaching but hide their real intentions and beliefs. They do not
reveal their religious views or their da’wa until they feel confident that the individuals they are approaching are
interested in learning about Islam through the liqo sessions.
18 Restrictions on the number of trainees (mutarabbi) in religious circles are also used in the Egyptian MB
(Mitchell 1993).
19 Pengajian (Indonesian) is a religious learning group whose members specifically learn about the Qur’an,
Sunna and other key Islamic subjects. Pengajian is usually attended by more than twenty people. It currently
has several names, including majlis ta’lim (learning session).
20 A similar number of liqo members were also found in other liqo groups that my interviewees (who are liqo
trainees (mutarabbi or mutarabbiyah) in Jakarta and other cities such as Tangerang and Bekasi) were members
of.




was a college student. All of us met at the liqo meeting place which was a trainee’s
house. The majority of the trainees travelled to the weekly liqo session on their own
motorcycles, whilst some travelled by car and were either dropped off by their
husbands or drove themselves. Two trainees travelled to the liqo sessions on public
transportation. Our mentor sometimes drove to the liqo venue in her private car, and
sometimes came on her motorcycle. All the trainees came dressed in soft-coloured long
dresses, with thick kerudung or jilbab (both types of headscarves) covering their neck
and extending over their chest. This is the most commonly adhered to Islamic dress
code among the liqo women’s community. My close observations revealed that it is
almost impossible to find liqo trainees dressing in jeans or cotton trousers and tops,
with face make-up or with up-to-date styles of kerudung (headscarves).22 Such clothes
are regarded as ‘non-Islamic’ and as an influence of Westernisation. The absence of
liqo women activists wearing such clothes or make-up is one of the characteristics of
those that the liqo lessons attract.23
Although the liqo sessions are scheduled to last for 2 h, my observations and
interviews with my trainees revealed that they usually last much longer than this.
The liqo that I joined during my fieldwork was conducted every Saturday morning for
about 3 h, from 09.00 am until 12.00 pm. The liqo was held in the living room of a
different trainee’s house each week so that the trainees got to know each other and
became closer. All of us were relatively new members, and before joining this group
none of us had any experiences related to liqo lessons or Tarbiyah movement. We met
each other at the first liqo mentoring session, and each of us joined this group through
recommendations from senior mentors that lived in the same district. New mentors
(murabbiah) are chosen to establish new liqo groups by their former mentors, who also
manage these new mentors.24 Given that all trainees are new recruits to the liqo
network, we were advised to learn basic Islamic topics, such as shahadat and other
aqidah or tawhid-related topics. We were given basic topics on Islam because we were
classified as beginners in this community, with none of the learning experiences that we
had outside the liqo being taken into account, and the lessons were delivered in bahasa
(the Indonesian language). Both my experience of attending the liqo and my conver-
sations with members of other liqo revealed that it is common to commence the liqo
sessions with one of the trainees reading two or more selected Qur’anic verses out
while the mentor and the other trainees listen. After this, the trainees remain seated on
the thinly carpeted floor and listen attentively in silence as the mentor explains the topic
for the day. The mentor then relates the topic to everyday life with practical examples,
and invites questions from the trainees. A serious atmosphere was maintained through-
out the session, with very little joking or chatting.
However, in the liqo group that I joined, this silent and serious atmosphere only
occurred when none of the trainees brought their children. Most of the liqomeetings that
I attended were noisy, with children crying and screaming. Consequently, the lessons
22 My reflection is that this dress code and its performance represent a ‘marker of difference’ that makes it easy
to identify liqo women in Jakarta public areas, such as malls or shopping centres, hospitals, street and offices,
where their style of dress does not represent the mainstream clothing style for Muslim women.
23 The liqo community have typical perspective on women’s dress codes, including the veil and headscarves,
and the doctrinal reasoning that lies behind their choices and commitments.
24 This system of shifting in role from a trainee (mutarabbi) to a mentor (Murabbi) is employed whenever a
new small liqo group is established, with trainees always chosen to be new mentors by their liqo mentors.
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were often stopped for a number of short periods whilst the mothers calmed their
children down and got them back playing with their toys or else took them away from
the circle. The liqo allows mothers to bring their children as it aims to accommodate
mothers’ responsibilities. The movement believes that women members, just like men,
are obliged to attend the weekly liqo, and because caring for children is perceived to be
the woman’s responsibility, it is thus accepted that womenmust be allowed to bring their
children when they attend the liqo. My interviews with male liqomembers and mentors
indicated that it is less common for men to bring their children to liqo sessions, which
indicates that women get little help from their family in looking after their children.
It is common for new recruits to leave their groups when they cannot find what they
are looking for. My observations during the 4 months that I attended the liqo group
confirmed this phenomenon. Two of the nine liqo trainees did not come again after the
first two sessions, and therefore only seven trainees continued with the weekly meet-
ings. I could see that those who came were very enthusiastic and committed to
improving their skill in reciting the Qur’an and to learning other basic Islamic knowl-
edge. Such small ‘family’ groups are expected to make it easier for mentors to build the
ethos of the groups and to discipline each liqo trainee. During my observations,
however, I rarely found a situation in which the mentor built a good learning environ-
ment that encouraged the trainees to raise questions. In many cases, the trainees were
passive, and tended to be afraid to express their opinions. Such experiences were
supported by the women’s statements during the interviews that I conducted with them.
Thus, the way the mentors delivered the lessons did not constitute an exploratory
approach in which trainees had the opportunity to reflect on their lessons, but was
mostly instructive, consisting of guidance to create an ethos of discipline.
Women’s conversion to the Liqo
As Wiktorowicz (2001:133) argues, “social networks play a critical role in social
movement recruitment”, and this is also true for the liqo movement. Their social
networks are mainly built through kinship and personal relationships. Although liqo
activists target all Muslims, regardless of their backgrounds or organisational affilia-
tions, they see that a prior personal relationship makes it easier to invite individuals to
join the movement. Family members, friends, and people living in the same location,
like neighbours, are those that are considered as personal relationships. The liqo trainees
that I interviewed typically cited the ‘intervention’ of family members or friends who
had already joined the liqo as the reason for their conversion. Tania, one of the trainees
said that she initially joined the weekly liqo sessions through being encouraged to attend
by her classmate in the Nurul Fikri education centre.25 She shares her story as follows:
25 The Nurul Fikri learning centre is widely associated with the Tarbiyah movement, and was founded by
Tarbiyah activists in 1985. The literature and the official website of the centre mentions that their motivation
and purpose is to help students to develop their skills in order to enter top state universities after graduating
from senior high school (see Damanik 2002). However, I observed that this institution as part of the da’wa
strategy of the Tarbiyah movement. Evidence for this can be seen in the topics discussed among students of
Nurul Fikri, the ‘typical’ books on Islam used by the Tarbiyah movement that are widely circulated among
them (such as books written by the key figures of the MB and the PKS) and, of course, in the rules for
behaviour and their physical performances of them, which all strongly relate to the Tarbiyah movement.
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In the last stage of my SMA (Sekolah Menengah Atas/Senior high School), I
joined the Nurul Fikri training centre to prepare in pursuing higher education at
the University of Indonesia (UI). In this centre I found new close friends as we
met every day for about three hours at a minimum to learn various school
subjects. I made even closer relationships with my classmate, who invited me
to join her ‘religious’ learning group that later on I knew as liqo or halaqah
group. She said that it is important not to forget religious subjects as well as
school subjects, such as Maths, Physics etc.
Rina from West Sumatra – who moved to Jakarta to pursue her Master Degree at a
state university, and then worked to earn money to support herself – reported that
her older brother who is a figure closely related to the PKS was involved in her
decision to join the liqo:
I was initially asked by my brother to attend one of the religious programmes in
Bogor, managed by the Tarbiyah community in my new campus. It was a very
intensive religious training for one full week. I had to attend the overall pro-
gramme over the week, and was not allowed to go outside the training venue
during the whole week. During the training, I was told that this one-week training
was an introductory programme for the potential trainees before they officially
join the weekly liqo sessions. In my opinion, this training was significant in
building my understanding on Islamic teaching, as taught by the Tarbiyah, and it
attracted me to attend the regular liqo sessions afterwards.
In my opinion, this training represented an important ‘indoctrination’ phase for Rina, as
well as aiming to test her interest and engagement. Although Rina’s explanation shows
that her decision to join the liqo came gradually, it was clearly influenced by the one-
week ‘indoctrination’ training that she attended. This training and experience made her
aware of the importance of participating in such an Islamic group, and the advantages
she would accrue from doing so. As Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson contend,
“people seldom initially join movements per se; rather, they typically participate in
movement activities and only gradually became members” (Snow et al. 1980:795).26
Moreover, Rina’s brother played a very important role, not only in introducing her to
the movement, but also in persuading her to participate and to join a group. In this
regard, the role of families and friends, or so-called social networks, is to introduce,
promote, and persuade potential members to join the movement. Therefore, candidates’
decisions about whether they should join or decline are not only influenced by their
own considerations, but also by the support, encouragement and ‘pressure’ of their
relatives or friends.27 This trend will be discussed in further detail below, based on my
observations of the women’s liqo group in which I participated in Jakarta.
26 See also Clark’s discussion in Wiktorowicz (2004:171).
27 Based on official documents published by the PKS and my interviews with leaders, I found that the
‘approaching familiars’ strategy, or recruitment through personal relationships, was most used by the liqo-
Tarbiyah movement during its emergence in the 1980s and through until the 1990s. However, this approach
has recently been used in tandem with other ‘public’ approaches. The leaders of the movement, however, still
consider the ‘private’ recruitment pattern as being more successful than ‘public’ recruitment in pulling
individuals to the liqo.
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My observation of the women’s liqo group that I joined during my fieldwork also
supported the hypothesis that social networks play a significant role in women’s
decisions to join the liqo. The female liqo trainees from my group described the
influence exerted by liqo members who were husbands, other family members (sisters
or brothers), or friends and neighbours on their decision-making. Within my liqo group,
three female trainees (mutarabbiah) were sisters from the same family. During my
informal conversation with Mona, one of these three sisters who had graduated from
the School of Design at a state university in Solo-Central Java, she explained:
I come from Central Java for working in Jakarta. My two older sisters have been
working here a few years before me. Following my arrival in Jakarta, I saw them
every week and came to a religious meeting [the liqo]. I think that it would be
good for me if I joined them as well. Besides learning religious subjects, I can
also find new friends from this meeting. So, three of us gathered in one liqo
group. However, not too long after I joined this liqo, one of my sisters moved to
another liqo group in a different part of Jakarta following her husband.
A female trainee named Fathya said that she attended a liqo group in the Pondok Aren-
Tangerang district through an invitation from her friend and neighbour. Such experi-
ences were not unique to Rina, Tania, and Fathya, but were shared by my other
interviewees, who were friends or neighbours with one another, or who had liqo
members in their families before they joined their groups. The interventions of family
members, friends, or neighbours that are more senior members in the liqo encourages
others not only to join, but to ‘convert’ to the liqo perspective or ideology.28 They
‘convert’ in the sense that they change their perspective on particular issues in Islam,
and shift their daily attitudes or practices to ones that they consider to be superior to
those that they held before becoming involved in the liqo.
My interviews also revealed that marriages to liqo activists have supported the
process of conversion to the liqo ideology and perspective.29 For instance, Retno, a
liqo trainee told me that she was encouraged to attend the liqo by her husband, who had
been a liqo activist since long before they were married, as did Nuriyah, whose husband
28 The discourse of ‘conversion’ is common inWestern sociology of religion. It does not always involve literal
conversion to a different religion, but can often be about changes of ideology, mind, and practice. In Britain,
people become ‘born again Christians’, which refers to a change in their religious beliefs and attitudes and/or
practices. In the United States in the 1970s, a growing number of young well-educated people began
converting to the ‘New Religious Movements (NRMs)’ and they were very visible in public places – on
the streets –where they sold flowers and candles and invited young people to their centres. The growing trends
of conversion amongst young people led to the idea that the trainees of various NRMs were being brainwashed
through various techniques. For further discussion of ‘conversion’ in the Western context see, for instance,
Barker (1984). Conversion in the West also includes conversion to Islam, of course. Nehemia Levtzion in
“Conversion to Islam (1979)”, however, differentiates between conversion and adhesion. Conversion usually
involving individuals in a ‘reorientation of the soul’ and in a commitment to a new way of life and adhesion
typically a communal process entailing ‘the acceptance of new worship as useful supplements and not as
substitutes” to what went before. Thus according to Levtzion:‘Islamisation of a social or ethic group is not a
single act of conversion but a long process toward greater conformity and orthodoxy’ (1979: 21). In my
opinion, the discourse of conversion is similar to the spirit of da’wa in Islam, which aims to make the beliefs
and practices of Muslims better, and includes the da’wa of the Tarbiyah movement/the PKS in Indonesia. See,
for instance, Poston (1992) and Janson (2003).
29 See also Asyari and Abid (2016) on how the Tarbiyah movement expanding its network through marriage.
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is a PKS functionary and a senior mentor of the liqo. Two other female interviewees,
Tania and Nisya also told me that their husbands who are also the PKS functionaries
had been involved in their conversion to the liqo perspective.30 These stories suggested
to me that these women’s ‘conversions’ to liqo beliefs and practices were not merely
driven by their own free choices, but also by the encouragement and advice of their
husbands. Both encouragement and advice can be difficult for Indonesian wives to
refuse, particularly those who come from rural backgrounds, lack of educational
experience and limited economic access, where husbands have stronger voices and
wives are expected to follow their instructions, especially on religious matters. Close
observations and informal conversations with these female liqo activists revealed that
there is a growing trend of family ‘conversion’, in which husbands that have already
adopted the liqo perspective transmit it to their wives.
liqo activists expose their families and friends to the religious lessons taught in the
liqo through their everyday interactions with them. The interviewees said that the
process that their friends and family used to approach them was straightforward,
involving informal discussions about Islam. In many cases, various religious issues
were discussed, and the liqo activists took the opportunity to explain their liqo
perspectives on Islam. They made Islam a common topic of their daily conversations,
discussing it in public places, whilst having lunch at the office, or during social visits.
The conversations about religious issues were reported as being more intense by
trainees that were converted by family living in the same house. This is partly because
a sister or a brother who has either younger or older siblings has many chances to
discuss Islam with them – whilst cooking and eating dinner, watching television, or
talking before bed-time.
The female reception to the liqo lessons
During the weekly liqo sessions, the mentors (murabbi/murabbiah) are required to follow
the guidance from the official curricula of the liqo, called the Manhaj Tarbiyah.31 This
curriculum is the main reference point, particularly for the liqo/halaqah, and also other
da’wa and religious training related activities such as dawrah or taujih (religious lectures),
mabit (reciting the Qur’an overnight), praying and thinking of Allah (dhikr) and
mukhayam (religious camps).32 The book is designed for training and teaching all different
levels of trainees within the liqo of the Tarbiyah movement.33 The Manhaj Tarbiyah
explains the three key contents of the book, namely madah (subject or lesson), sarana
30 The role of husband in converting their wife into a religious movement has also revealed by Amrullah (2011).
She found that women she studied joined the Indonesian Tablighi Jama’at to obey their husbands’ commands.
31 This book, first published in 2005, contains 566 pages, and is one of the PKS’s key texts on movement
ideology. Produced by Media Insani Press, it is managed by the PKS’ Division of Cadres. The PKS leadership
expects that it will be the key volume used for the instruction and guidance of members in all lessons taught
among the Tarbiyah cadres. The back cover of the book confirms that theManhaj Tarbiyah is ‘developed to be
a da’wa curricula for cadres’ training’ (DPP PKS 2005: back cover). One of the Tarbiyah mentors told me,
that:“I am very happy to have this book because it contains very detailed curricula, and has learning steps for
every stage of the liqo”.
32 Further elaboration on Tarbiyah movement activities such as mukhayam, mabit, etc., see Salman 2006.
33 Levels of the trainees are; the beginner level (Kader Pemula), youth level (Kader Muda), intermediate level
(Kader Madya), mature level (Kader Dewasa).
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(methods of teaching) andmaraji’ (literature or texts used as key sources for each subject).
Lessons such as aqidah (faith/theological doctrines), fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) and
akhlak (ethics) in theManhaj Tarbiyah are similar to those in the curricula of most Islamic
educational organisations such as Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.34 How-
ever, the aims and references given for the subjects frame the text differently.35
This is also the case in the subject of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Firstly, it focuses
on purification issues typical of Salafists (cf. Meijer 2009); this is mentioned in its
purpose “to avoid any bid’ah (innovation) in each ibadah that is not taught by the
Prophet” (DPP PKS 2005: 82–83).36 Topics in this subject area also discuss how to
dress and behave in an Islamic fashion, aiming to reject the Western dress and Western
lifestyle that hugely influences Indonesian Muslims, especially the urban youth. For
women, wearing a headscarf and avoiding mixing with males in a class or a common
room (ikhtilath) are some of the issues taught. In the subject of akhlak (morality) is also
found a similar tone. In general, this subject covers various topics such as attitudes to
fellow Muslims, fulfilling promises, and other related topics. For instance, there is a
topic emphasizing that Tarbiyah members should not make friends with those who
have a ‘bad personality’. This means ‘those whose way of life is not in accordance with
Islam, enemies of Islam, and kafir (an infidel)’ (DPP PKS 2005:111). Based on my own
observations, this topic is also often referred to in supporting the movement’s harsh
attitudes to those who hold liberal interpretations of Islam. The most distinctive subject
in the Manhaj Tarbiyah is the subject of da’wa.37 This subject covers fiqh ad-da’wa,
sirah (Islamic history), the contemporary Islamic world, Islamic reform movements, as
well as Comparative Religions and Sects.38 The key content of this subject area is the
34 Furthermore, the texts (maraji’) used for teaching these subjects are mainly the works of ulama and
ideologues whose backgrounds and orientations link closely to the Islamist ideas of the MB in Egypt and
related movements. Some of those cited most routinely are: Sa’id Hawa (1935–1989) (Al-Islam), Abdul Karim
Zaidan (1917–2014) (The Principles of Da’wa), Mawdudi (1903–1979) (Islamic Principles), Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi (b.1926) (Characteristics of Islam), Abdullah Muslih and Shalah al-Ashmawi (Islamic Principles
for Life), and Abu Bakar al-Jazairi, (The Guidance of Muslims’ Lives). Thus, repeated reference to the works of
these Islamist ideologues in the liqo constructs an ideological framing that connects the leadership, mentors
and members of the Tarbiyah movement to the global Islamist movement in general and the MB in particular.
Although most of these references in the Manhaj Tarbiyah are mentioned by name in Arabic, the movement
typically uses translations of the originals in Indonesian for teaching and learning. This indicates that only a
small number of the liqo community knows Arabic. Moreover, Arabic is not taught much and even mentors do
not necessarily know Arabic.
35 Under the subject of aqidah, for instance, the trainees are expected: “1) to understand the comprehensiveness of
Islam compared to other religions; 2) to believe that Islam is a perfect way of life; and 3) to fully accept and obey
Islam so as not to practice any other way of life except Islam” (DPP PKS 2005: 46). This emphasizes that Islam is a
complete doctrine and way of life including social, economic, and political as well as religious dimensions in the
style of classic statements of Islamist ideology. Again in a style typical of classic Islamism, it also draws sharp
boundaries between Muslims and others, warning Tarbiyah members not to adopt other ways of life.
36 All quotations from these texts (Manhaj Tarbiyah) were all my own translations and not those of the authors.
37 Da’wa is part of a traditional education in Indonesia taught in both traditional and modern schools. Da’wa
in these schools is taught in a general sense for nurturing Islamic virtue among its students. However, in the
hands of modern Islamist da’wa activists such as the Tarbiyah movement, this subject has a new significance
and a more powerful meaning as an active da’wa particularly focused on rejecting Western culture and
strengthening weakened Islamic identities.
38 Through this lesson, the trainees are expected: (1) to understand factors that led to the weakness ofMuslims and
make every effort to solve the problem; 2) to understand the role of Tarbiyah (education) and harakah (movement)
in solving this problem; and 3) to believe that the only way to solve this problem is through joining theHizbullah
(warrior of Allah), that is through joining the Tarbiyah movement (DPP PKS 2005: 161–173).
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concept of ghazwul fikri (invasion of idea or ideological conquest). It is the core
ideology of the Tarbiyah movement and frequently expressed in the text of the Manhaj
Tarbiyah. One of the issues explained in terms of ghazwul fikri is the issue of ‘the
enemies of Islam’.39
Women’s reception to the concept of ghazwul fikri
In regard to the female liqo’s receptions of ghazwul fikri (al-ghazwa al-fikri, invasion of
idea or ideological conquest), my interviews with the majority of the leaders revealed
that the idea of ghazwul fikri is seen as having an important role for members of the liqo,
in all levels.40 Siti, one of the female mentor (murabbiah) of my liqo group contended
that Muslims’ enemies find it easier to contaminate the Muslim faith through importing
Western culture, adding that “when Muslims adopt a Western culture, it indicates that
Muslims have been implicitly defeated by the West”.41 Siti’s opinions emerged when
she provided examples of ‘Western’ phenomena in contemporary Indonesian culture,
such as in women’s fashion and behaviours and attitudes in public places that regarded
as ‘un-Islamic or less-Islamic’, for example the relationship of young male and female
Muslims and their impolite attitudes to older people. Such perceptions are commonly
found amongst revivalists and Islamists, who believe that Muslims should avoid
imitating non-Muslim culture and worry that the cultural domination of the West will
make them lose their ‘authenticity’ and identity as ‘true’ Muslims. From my own
observations as well as my informal conversations with the mentor and all trainees from
my liqo group, I found that the West is considered to be a potential enemy of Islam. In
several liqo sessions that I attended, the mentor used ghazwul fikri to construct and
defineWestern culture and politics as a threat. Themurabbiah perceived ghazwul fikri to
be an unconventional type of war – a ‘soft war’ – that the enemies of Muslims adopted
because they could not defeat them in a physical war.
For this reason, even though the content of ghazwul fikri is related to Westernisation,
the mentor often connected the issue with Zionism instead. Unfortunately however, my
mentor, like other senior liqo members, failed to clearly explain how or why Zionism
39 The purposes of this subject as written in the text are that the trainees are able: 1) to recognize various
groups or organizations that aim to destroy Islam from both inside or outside Islam, 2) to understand the
purposes, strategies and activities of these organizations, and 3) to explain the danger of these organizations to
Muslim fellows and to respond to these organizations effectively (Manhaj Tarbiyah 2005:545–546). Key
literature (maraji’) used for this subject are Ghazwul fikri (Hasan al-Banna), Ghazwul fikri (Mawdudi),
70 years of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Yusuf al-Qaradawi), Invasi Pemikiran or the Invasion of Thought (Abdus
Sattar), Du’at la Qudhat/Preachers not Judges (Hasan al-Hudaibi), and Manhaj Haraky (Mustafa Munir
Ghadban).
40 During my observation at the women’s liqo group, the issue of ghazwul fikriwas often raised by the mentor,
and used to analyse any topic she was teaching. In interviews with mentors from different and more advanced
liqo groups, I found that this is something that is done with senior members as well as beginners. This was
indicated by the fact that interviewees often responded to my questions by making connections to ghazwul
fikri, even though I did not ask them about its connection with the topics they were talking about. This
suggests that the concept of ghazwul fikri has a significant influence on the community of the Tarbiyah
movement as a whole.
41 For those who strongly hold the idea of ghazwul fikri, globalization or Westernisation is perceived as a
threat. Bruinessen (2013) further explains various forms of Western cultural invasion such as popular music,
dance and movies, popular culture and dress styles. Certain religious thought such as liberalism, secularism
and the idea of pluralism are included as Western cultural invasion.
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has had such a significant influence in constructing Western civilisation and ideology,
and it seemed to me that they could not clearly understand why and how Zionism is put
into a single package with the West. The mentor of my group believed that Zionism
was the agent behind ghazwul fikri, and that its purpose is not only to take Palestine
fromMuslims, but also to defeat Muslims anywhere and everywhere by infiltrating and
contaminating their faith, ideology, and culture. The murabbiah put it as follows when I
interviewed her:
Zionism is the source of ghazwul fikri. Zionism influences the global world
(European and American states), not only seeking to control Palestine, but
also all Muslim countries. Zionism wants to defeat Muslims by infiltrating our
Islamic ideology.
Thus, for the mentor, da’wa is seen as necessary for counteracting Western propaganda.
She said:” Young Muslims have been exposed to the globalised cultures that are
completely far from the teachings of Islam. The changing directions of Muslims can
be seen, for instance, in terms of dress, behaviour, and other lifestyles”.
This view is typical of the ideas held by Islamists. Similarly, the murabbiah also
highlighted the conflict between Palestine and Israel, the American invasion of Iraq,
and the conflict in Afghanistan or Syiria as examples of Western conspiracies to
undermine Muslim power. Through my interviews with mentors and trainees from
different liqo groups I concluded that this perception is strong among the liqo commu-
nity. The mentor’s claims above implicitly suggest that Christians as well as Jews are
proponents of Zionism. However, the female mentor of a liqo group who I interviewed
argued that she does not consider all Jews and Christians to be the enemies of Muslims.
She says that the global picture of ghazwul fikri – that Muslims should be aware of
Zionism – does not mean that all non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) are the enemy of
Islam or part of the Zionist movement.42 This claim is being made in the liqo of the
beginner level that I participated in. As a new member, I was not allowed to participate
in the intermediate or advanced liqo level classes. However, through my interviews and
interactions with trainees studying at the more advanced levels, I found that they
expressed a more flexible understanding of the discourse of ghazwul fikri. Their
flexibility, however, can be seen as part of the da’wa strategy at the public and the
state level.
One likely impact of ghazwul fikri is that it encourages the female liqo trainees to
believe that they have enemies that are attempting to separate them from Islamic
teachings. This hypothesis was confirmed by the experience of Ridho, one of the liqo
mentors from Bekasi, who shared his experiences of beginning his liqo participation:
When I was invited to attend a daurah at a villa in Gunung Salak-West Java, I got
many interesting subjects. The event has opened my mind that Islam is an
incredible and honourable religion so that, having been born as Muslims, we
have to be happy. From this training, I just realised that Muslims nowadays are in
42 I heard the claim from other mentor or trainer that the trainees will also be taught other Qur’anic verses
clarifying this issue in the next levels of their liqo sessions in order to make them not generalise that all of Jews
and Christians are the enemy of Islam.
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a dangerous situation. Through the topic of ghazwul fikri, I realised that we
(Muslims) have a huge enemy who are attacking us softly in many aspects. Let’s
see the reality. There are many evidences supporting this suspicion. As an
example, let us take a look at teenagers here (in Jakarta). Most of them no longer
have respect for the Prophet Muhammad. They also do not know their life’s aim
[based on Islamic teachings].
This testimony fits with the da’wa manual’s explanation that the purpose of teaching
ghazwul fikri is to make members aware that there are numerous movements seeking to
defeat and harm Muslims. This lesson of ghazwul fikri is frequently linked by the
mentor to the wider context of wars or conflicts in Muslim lands, Western double-
standards and global inequalities –as also written in the Manhaj Tarbiyah (2005: 302).
Thus, the concept of ghazwul fikri was perceived by the mentor and the trainees in this
liqo group as cleaving people into two groups: ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. The mentor
appealed to such characterisations in order to strengthen the Islamic identities of the
liqo trainees in an attempt to ‘de-westernise’ them, both culturally and ideologically.
This bifurcation of people and cultures into friends and enemies appears to be driven by
the worry that living in a modern society in which Western culture and its values
dominate could reduce the commitment that Muslims have to their religion. Thus, this
concept of ghazwul fikri led female liqo community of having such a strong response to
public political discourses both in international or national contexts. Although these
female liqo were not part of the more conventional hard-line groups such as FPI and
HTI, they responded to the Ahok case in a very active and even aggressive reaction.43
Apart from the Ahok case, the female liqo community also reacted massively and
joined the demonstrations over the conflicts in the global Muslim world such as
conflicts in Syiria, Iraq, and Palestine.
Women’s reception of Aqidah
Apart from the lesson of ghazwul fikr, aqidah is also one of the topics taught to the
female members in the liqo.44 The liqo community believes that the ‘true’ aqidah
should refer to the interpretation made by the early generations of Muslims.45 The liqo
community perceives the interpretations of the Quran that were made during these
periods as being the most authoritative, and regards these three generations of Muslims
43 Ahok (Basuki Tjahaya Purnama) is a Chinese and Christian former governor of Jakarta (2014–2017) that
accused of blasphemy in 2017. He was convicted of blasphemy because of his speech made during his visit/
pre-election campaign in September 2016. In his speech, he implied that Muslim leaders were trying to trick
Muslim voters by using a Qur’anic verse to argue that Muslim should not vote for a non-Muslim leader. This
case sparked protests and demonstration in Jakarta as they believe that Ahok’s speech insulted Islam.
44 The aqidah is related to the basis of faith in which Muslims conceptualise their perception of God. For
instance, aqidah explains the tenet of the oneness of God as Tawhid (the unity of God). Tawhid is the belief
that distinguishes Muslims from non-Muslims, such as Christians, Jews, and Hindus. The importance of this
topic is confirmed in statements by liqo activists from all levels of seniority. Tifa, one of my participants
says:“The materials at the beginning of the liqo mostly talk about the very basic and important topics such as
Tawhid (the concept of the unity of God), Shahadatain (the two phrases of the testimony of faith), and Qada
and Qadar (God’s determination)”.
45 The three early generations comprising the first generation – the sahabah (the Prophet’s companions); the
second generation – the tabi’un (those who lived one generation after the Prophet’s companions); and the third
generation – the tabi’ at-tabi’in (the generation after the tabi’in).
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as being the most committed to Islam. A senior murabbi, Abdullah revealed, a
“Muslim’s faith should be based on the true aqidah. We call it salafiyatul aqidah –
the belief of the Salaf people, the early pious companions”.46 For me, this is the factor
that appears to lead many people in Indonesia to label the liqo community as Salafi.47
Although the liqo community rejects this label, they share one common key charac-
teristic with the Salafi network – the idea that aqidah and rituals are based on these
three generations of Muslims. The concept of aqidah is also embraced by many Islamic
revivalist movements, who purify it by purging it of anything that they consider to
comprise ‘non-Islamic’ belief. Thus, by adopting aqidah, the liqo clearly shows its
revivalist character.
The subject of aqidah is used to unite the liqo community during the liqo sessions
through the promotion of the concept of ‘a true aqidah’. A senior mentor who is
experienced in leading liqo activities said that the distinctive feature that unifies all liqo
members – from the beginning of its establishment to its current incarnation – is their
concept of true aqidah. This concept is frequently heard from the Tarbiyah community
when they are in the periods of political leader election, particularly during governor or
presidential elections. They believe that choosing a governor, a president or other
political leaders must be based on the main criteria namely the true aqidah. They argue
that choosing them based on the true aqidah is part of an obligation for Muslims. I
observed during two elections of Jakarta Governor (2012 and 2017), and two elections
of president (2014 and 2019), the liqo community actively engaged in making a public
discourses through promoting a candidate that according to them fitted with their
criteria of having true aqidah.
This concept was also mentioned by the female mentor and the trainees in my liqo
group not only in relation to political leader campaigns but also in relation to any
deviations. They held that the Muslim faith has to be saved from any deviations,
arguing that klenik (Javanese mysticism) is one such deviation commonly found among
Indonesian Muslims.48 Miya, a female trainee who migrated from a small village in
Central Java to Jakarta explained her experience of klenik’s influence on her family and
neighbours in the village:
The cultural practices in my village are very much coloured by klenik. For
instance, before the harvest, people must bring sesajen (foods provided for
God) to the rice field. When a neighbour passes away, we should commemorate
him or her with the recitation of ‘Laa ilaaha illa-llah’ (there is no god but God)
called tahlilan, particularly in the 3rd, 7th, and 40th days after their death. Also
when there is someone marrying or delivering a new baby in the family, we need
to conduct particular traditions. All these occasions should be accompanied by
providing certain foods (sesajen). Another practice is sort of giving alms, well
known as sedekah punden, that is arranged once a year. In my village, there is an
46 Salaf is taken from the Arabic root which means ‘to precede’. In the Islamic lexicon, this word refers to al-
Salaf al-Salih – the virtuous companions of the Prophet Muhammad – i.e. the three generations of Muslims
that followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad (Rippin 2005).
47 In an interview that I conducted with a senior liqo mentor, he noted that people around him frequently label
him and his liqo group as the Salafi.
48 For the liqo community, klenik refers to cultural ‘deviations’ that influence the Islamic beliefs of Muslims. For
other people, klenik refers to Javanese mysticism, which is heavily influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism.
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ancestral grave (makam leluhur) called Punden. People of this village arrange to
visit and gather at this grave and bring many main foods and side dishes (lauk
pauk), pray together (led by a charismatic village leader), and then eat together in
this place.
For the liqo community, visiting graves and praying for saintly intercessions are both
regarded as being close to idolatry. As the leaders of the liqo stated, these two ‘beliefs’
are the main actions for so-called ‘grievous crime’ (zulmun ‘azimun or zalalun
ba’idun).49 In addition, the book asserted that these actions “could annul the witness
to the faith (shahadatain)” (DPP PKS 2005:62). These ‘klenik’ cultural practices
represent everything that is considered to be un-Islamic by the liqo community.50
The conception of faith (aqidah) developed by the liqo is very critical of the traditional
culture (klenik-based) faiths practiced by particular societies in Indonesia. In contrast to
the official discourse, Miya states that she disagrees with the klenik rituals because of
the waste of food they produce. She argues “What I am disappointed with was the fact
that the food used for rituals is reallymubadzir (superfluous or waste of foods), because
it is too much and not provided for eating”. Miya’s expression of her views shows that
ordinary members have their own outlooks about why particular traditional rituals are
bad for Muslims.
The concept of ‘true aqidah’, as it was taught in my liqo group, encouraged the
trainees to think that many Muslims in Indonesia practise distorted versions of aqidah.
Given that the majority of liqo trainees, particularly those that I interviewed in my liqo
group, had only encountered this concept of aqidah for the first time at the liqo
sessions, they were shocked that the religious traditions in their society were not in
line with the Islamic faith. A female trainee, share her story as follows:
When I was studying the topic of aqidah, it was so tempestuous (bergejolak)
indeed. I found that there were so many ‘Islamic traditions’ that are not fitted with
Islamic teachings. Why could our society practice this tradition that is completely
contradicted in Islamic teachings?
Miya, a mother of two in her early thirties, had no knowledge of the concept of aqidah
or the issues surrounding it when she lived in her small town in Central Java. After
moving to Jakarta, attending the liqo sessions and finding a new community, she was
surprised to discover that many of the customs or rituals practised by her relatives and
villagers are apparently ‘un-Islamic’. The rituals include the ritual of building and
entering new houses, ritual of birth, ritual of pregnancy, and ritual of death. She
continued her story:
Furthermore, when reflecting on the issues of aqidah in my closest society, I
am very sad because it is very far from the tenets of Islam. The sadness
increases when I notice that my grandma also strongly believes in un-Islamic
49 Both are Qur’anic (Q 31:13 and Q 4:60; 116) words that imply the same meaning: “a grievous crime”.
50 The liqo community shares common concerns with other revivalist organisations such as the
Muhammadiyah about aqidah being free from klenik, and this fits with the core revivalist belief that “the
rejuvenation of Islam was to be achieved through a return to the universal core teachings [of Islam], free from
distorting influences of socio-cultural innovation” (Mandaville 2007:44).
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traditions. She strongly believes if we do not do certain ‘rituals’, something
bad will be happening. For instance, if she sees a neighbour building his house
without a sesajen (providing certain services i.e. foods), she will speak that
something bad will be happening to their family.51 I am very sad about her.
She is already old and she still believes in this un-Islamic practice. In a month
she is very busy to come to her neighbour’s rituals and gives ‘special’ prayers
(based on her traditional/cultural beliefs) for any birth, death or any occasion
of a family member.
The liqo mentors had a strong influence on the female trainees’ acceptance of the
concept of ‘true’ aqidah (faith) through exemplifying good standards of behaviour and
commitment to their Islamic teaching. The female trainees thus saw their murabbi as
good practitioners of Islam. This commitment to their values is very important for the
trust that trainees have in their mentors – perhaps more than other qualities or
characteristics such as having a good Islamic education, as a statement from Fadila, a
female trainee (mutarabbi) at a different liqo group suggested:
The mentors of the liqo are very simple. They learn something very basic about
Islam, so that they know only little religious knowledge. However, they practised
this knowledge in their daily life, for example on learning and practising the five
times daily prayers and reading the Qur’an. This is sometimes very different with
those who have deep knowledge on religious matters, who do not prioritise
implementing their knowledge due to their busyness with other activities.
A similar view was expressed by Nabila, another female trainee – a graduate from an
Islamic modern boarding school that had joined a number of different liqo both in
Indonesia and while she was overseas. She was attracted to the liqo lessons because of
their practical or applied aspects, stating:” Actually, I did not find new Islamic
knowledge from the liqo lessons. What I got more was the advantages of the spirit or
ethos in implementing the rituals in our daily life”.
Sometimes trainees had difficulty in accepting and practicing aqidah, especially at
the beginning of the courses, as their traditional faiths or cultures clashed with ‘the true
aqidah’ offered by the liqo. This was more common in trainees who came from rural
family backgrounds that were strongly influenced by local traditions. Thus, different
trainees have different levels of acceptance, and experience different amounts of
resistance to accepting and understanding new information on aqidah. During my
observations, a range of experiences were communicated by the murabbiah and
mutarabbiah about their parents’ rejections of aqidah. The parents regarded the aqidah
as too strict and rigid. However, some parents would gradually understand and come to
accept the liqo’s concept of ‘true’ aqidah. Thus, these aqidah lessons are also some-
times successful in ‘converting’ trainees’ parents as well.
In addition to building Islamic personality or religiosity, the main purpose of the liqo
and other Tarbiyah activities is to train individuals to provide da’wa – i.e. to tell other
people about the liqo’s teachings. For example, when they come to accept that un-
51 Her grandmother’s belief here is basically a ‘superstition’ – an ‘irrational’ belief in supernatural powers
relating to receiving good and bad luck.
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Islamic traditions have to be eliminated, not only reform themselves, but are also eager
to change their families’ beliefs. Inviting other Muslims – especially one’s family – to
reform themselves is a practice that is strongly encouraged by the mentors. Based on
the observations and interviews, I concluded that this is a part of the liqo’s da’wa
strategy – to encourage trainees to go back to their families and societies and advise
them to do what the liqo teaches. Similar approach is chosen and managed by female
trainees when they campaigning PKS candidates for a political position. They have a
very strong motivation and perception that this ‘job’ is part of their da’wa. Moreover,
this is also used as a strategy for encouraging new members to join the liqo sessions,
and a part of the more general da’wa strategy designed by the Tarbiyah to create
preachers (da’i) who are able to conduct da’wa for everyone and everywhere. Retno, a
female trainee (mutarabbiyah) who used to be a member of a liqo group in the
Kemanggisan area of Jakarta but moved to a liqo group in Pondok Aren-Tangerang
shared her da’wa experience as follows:
I have been trying to remind them about this wrong tradition, because many of
the village people are still my big family. Usually, after that, I leave them to think.
I do not really care about their response. The most important thing for me is to do
what I have to do, which is to give them true Islamic understandings on such
practices (un-Islamic rituals).
Women’s reception of Ibadah
One of the next lessons to be prioritised in the liqo sessions is the topic of ibadah
(worship).52 My research revealed that a strong emphasis is placed on ritual activities
within the liqo community. Athya, a female mentor (mutarabbiyah) voiced her con-
cerns as follows:
The subject of ibadah in the liqo is very crucial in order to remind Muslims about
their obligations towards God, especially in the modern era. Sometimes we find a
situation where we are very busy or too lazy to perform our daily ‘ibadah, such as
five-time obligatory prayers, reading the Qur’an, and the Tahajud prayer.
The variety of ritual activities or acts of worship in a liqo group depends on the
agreements made between the mentor and the trainees of each liqo group. One liqo
group could pursue different types of ibadah acts or have different targets concerning
the quantity of acts to perform in relation to another group. Miya, a liqo female trainee
who has been a member of the liqo for about 7 years shared her experiences:
In the beginning of each liqo meeting, usually both mentors and trainees will
discuss and decide together on how many and what kind of rituals should be
monitored through the evaluation sheet (sofhah mutaba'ah). For my current
52 Ibadah means ‘ritual’, and refers to the codified procedures that express human beings’ relationship with
God. In Islam, ibadah involves the profession of faith, prayer (shalat), fasting (shaum), the giving of alms
(zakah), and pilgrimage (hajj) (Rippin 2005).
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mentor and group, we have three key rituals to put in our sofhah mutaba'ah. The
first is to pray voluntary, Dhuha; the second is to perform obligatory prayers
(shalat wajib) in the mosque collectively (secara berjamaah); and the last is to
read the Qur’an on an everyday basis so that one juz of the Qur’an can be finished
in one month.53 Since all rituals are our own decision with the mentor, we do not
need to have difficulty or burden in doing all of these activities.
Although the trainees have a chance to ‘negotiate’ concerning the rituals they perform,
the liqo does set certain requirements. For example, Thifa, a young female mentor of a
liqo explained:
The standard of ibadah recommended and monitored by the liqo is Monday and
Thursday’s voluntary fasting (shaum sunnah), which is twice in a week, or it is
also allowed [to be] the three days voluntary fasting in a month for those who
have difficulty in performing two days fasting in a week.54 Another activity is
reading one page of the Qur’an per day and doing the Dhuha prayer and the
voluntary prayers before or after five time obligatory prayers.55
These ibadah activities – as interviewees stated and my observations attested – are fully
planned and monitored through a regular review and evaluation sheet called sofhah
mutaba’ah. This evaluation sheet is a way for mentors to keep track of their trainees’
performance, and the same evaluation sheet is provided for both male and female liqo
groups. It is designed to ensure that the objectives of the liqo are achieved. For many of
the trainees that I interacted with, both during and outside the liqo sessions, the liqowas
seen as the place for training a variety of ibadah. The greatest advantage they received
was to improve the quality and routine of their ibadah.
Athya, a neighbour of mine who had been a member of the liqo for more than 15
years acknowledged that she found herself “sometimes lazy for doing the daily rituals
such as Tahajud prayer and reading al-Qur’an”.56 She thus saw it as a benefit to have
her rituals checked by the mentors through the sofhah mutaba’ah. The sofhah
mutaba’ah review system shows the extent to which the liqo pays attention to the
lesson of ibadah and its practice. This was evident in the advice that I witnessed the
mentor of our group giving trainees concerning becoming accustomed to ritual prac-
tices, such as conducting prayers five times a day collectively at the mosques (as-sholat
al-jama’ah fi al-masajid), performing voluntary prayers (as-sholat as-sunnah), reading
the Qur’an (tilawah), and performing voluntary fasting (As-shaum as-sunnah). Under
the mentors’ monitoring and the sofhah mutaba’ah system, a trainee who does not
perform one of these rituals will likely feel shame in the presence of other more
disciplined trainees.
53 Juz (Arabic, plural: ajza) literally means ‘part’. The Qur’an is divided into thirty parts.
54 Shaum (Ar), puasa (Ind) is fasting or the abstention from all food, drink and sexual intercourse during
daylight hours. There is an obligatory form of shaum, which includes fasting during Ramadan, and a non-
obligatory form of shaum, which involves choices such as fasting on Mondays and Thursdays.
55 Shalat (Arabic and Indonesian) means ‘prayer’. The ritual required in Islam is that of five specific periods of
prayer a day.
56 Tahajud prayer is a voluntary nightly prayer that Muslims perform in addition to their five obligatory prayers.
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However, this monitoring system is perceived as a burden by some of the trainees. I
met Fathya, a former female trainee of the liqo who was disappointed with this strict
rule of ibadah, and quit the liqo sessions, saying: “the ibadah that I must perform in a
day is too many for me, because I need also to consider other work that I should fulfil to
raise money for the family”. Leaders of the liqo maintain that the objective of this
lesson is to build an in-depth consciousness for practising ritual activities consistently
and regularly. The movement wants to train all liqo members to perform these rituals
habitually. Ahmad, one of the most influential leaders among the Tarbiyah community
points out that the ‘notification’ (ta’limat) is given to all levels of the liqo community –
from its leaders, to its mentors, to its trainees – in order to make the rituals or acts of
worship a habit. He provided the example below to make this clearer:
A few days prior to the month of Dzulhijjah, the ta’limatwill be spread among the
liqo community asking them to struggle in ten days to finish reading all parts of the
Al-Qur’an, to conduct five time prayers at themosques, and to perform the sacrifice
(qurban) of at least one buffalo (kerbau) for one family.57 This ta’limat aims to
make routines of these rituals among the community. For other Muslims, it is only
mubah which is flexible – to be done or to be left.58 However, we want to practice
these rituals because this is a good opportunity for us. Apart from Dzulhijjah’s
rituals, we also recommend all of the members to fast in Yaum al-Arafah (the final
day of hajj in Mecca) and to spread this habit to their surroundings.59
My interviews and observations revealed that ibadah activities on a daily basis are
regarded by the liqo community as the symbol or indication of true Muslims. Ibadah
activities are the genuine expression of their piety and obedience to God’s commands
as individual Muslims. Moreover, these rituals represent the complete manifestation of
the character of Islam for them, which needs to be adhered to and implemented by its
followers. In other words, these rituals or acts of worship are regarded by the Tarbiyah
movement as the key characteristics of pious Muslims. Thus, this analysis reveals that
the liqo aims to strengthen the Islamic identity of its trainees through improving
individuals’ performances of religious rituals. Living in urban and modern society
can cause Muslims to become less concerned with their daily ibadah, but this is central
for the liqo, regardless of its trainees’ other commitments. This focus thus shows that
the liqo attempts to Islamise its trainees.
Conclusion
This paper has explained the lived experiences of women’s member of liqo in Indone-
sia. It demonstrated the extent to which female members at the lower level of the liqo
share their lived religious experiences of joining the liqo and receiving its lessons. It is
57 Dzulhijjah is the last month in the Islamic calendar. The name of the month refers to the annual worship of
Muslims ‘Hajj’ (pilgrimage).
58 Mubah is an Arabic term that refers to an action that is neither recommended nor forbidden. It is, therefore,
religiously neutral.




obvious that the weekly liqo sessions have been designed and developed by the
Tarbiyah movement of the PKS. From the early 1980s, the liqo has always focused
on improving private piety through da’wa, but was transformed in 1998 to also develop
public piety via Islamic political party. This new formality led to the reformulation of
the Tarbiyah movement’s official structure, official curricula and recruitment system.
Membership associated with the liqo of the Tarbiyah movement thus became more
political with the emergence of the PKS. The drive to promote their da’wa messages to
the Indonesian society as a whole from the end of 1990s built ‘a mutual relationship’
between the liqo-Tarbiyah community and the PKS, but also moved the liqo away from
its original da’wa activities and orientations. From the point of view of the leaders of
the party (or the movement), the informal structures associated with the liqo signifi-
cantly contributes to the growth and mobilisation of the PKS’s cadres and develops the
quality of the da’wa party, as the PKS has appointed liqo graduates and senior liqo
activists as the party elites. They also consider it to be the case that the PKS enables the
liqo to expand and mobilise its da’wa network through its various activities. For the
cadres at the middle and lower levels of the movement, however, especially at the
grassroots level, the formalisation and pragmatism of the party has mixed and thus
diluted their ‘pure’ da’wa ideologies and orientations through its focus on political
interests and strategies. The female liqo community’s growth occurs via personal
networks, social networks and institutional networks. However, based on my observa-
tion to the female liqo group, networks created through informal personal relationships
still represent the strongest and most common way of attracting people to join the liqo
community. Liqo groups grow over time as every mentor and trainee, as part of their
da’wa, tries to ‘convert’ friends, family and neighbours to the liqo community. This
doubling-up of friendships or family relationship and religious sessions establishes a
high degree of group solidarity and loyalty within the liqo-Tarbiyah community.
Informal social networks remain an absolutely key resource for the movement.
Thus, I found that the lived experiences of female liqo community are heterogeneous
and complex. Their motivations for joining liqo are not merely to improve their
religiosity and piety in many cases, or by political desires as the leaders expect them
to be. Other significant reasons for these members joining liqo include expanding their
social networks (finding new friends), strengthening existing friendships, and obeying
their husbands who are PKS functionaries and member of the Tarbiyah movement.
Even though the lived religion and experiences of these members indicate the com-
plexity of their engagement with the liqo, the lessons given in the weekly liqo sessions
are nonetheless relatively effective in transmitting the official discourse of its leaders.
These lessons not only improve their knowledge of Islam, but also build their political
awareness and forge a common Islamic cultural and political identity among the
members. The lessons emphasising particular perspectives and practices not only
regarding religious contents such as aqidah (faith) and ibadah (acts of worship), but
also political contents on ghazwul fikri (ideological conquest). These lessons are
designed to create piety, obedience, and commitment in the liqo members, both
religiously and politically. This emphasis provides the mode for the expression of their
individual piety and Islamic identity. This piety and identity, in turn, creates certain
characteristics in the liqo community, which have become common symbolic expres-
sions unifying the liqo community whilst also differentiating it from other religious
communities within the Indonesian public sphere.
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Through the weekly lessons, the liqo aims to introduce a common set of shared life
norms, which include all aspects of life (such as beliefs, worship, and politics). These
represent a form of Islamic ‘totalism’ that is widely adopted by modern Islamists. The
liqo provides its trainees with a regular and monitored form of training that enables
them to apply all these aspects of Islam in their everyday lives. This set of life norms
creates their similarities as well as distinctiveness from other religious communities in
Indonesia. For instance, the lesson of ghazwul fikri is very important in terms of the liqo
community’s perspective about the cultural and ideological enemies of Islam. This
perspective creates particular attitudes among the female liqo community, who tend to
be suspicious of other cultures, especially Western culture, which they consider as a
potential threat to Islam and Muslim society in general, and has led them to place
people within one of two categories – ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’. This lesson thus seeks to
build the ‘self-awareness’ of the female liqo community about foreign cultures and
ideas outside Islam, and to increase their care in dealing with them. For example, these
female liqo cadres are very active in responding to the Ahok blasphemy case in 2017
although they were not part of the more conventional hard-liner groups such as HTI and
FPI. Similarly, the lessons of aqidah and ibadah aim to create liqo perspectives,
attitudes and performances that distinguish liqo women from women in other Muslim
communities in Indonesia. A similar distinctiveness in their perspectives and perfor-
mances can also be seen through the impact of the lessons of aqidah and ibadah. Thus,
although there are several similarities between the basic perspectives of the liqo and
those of other Muslim communities in relation to these four aspects of Muslim life, the
differences are nonetheless plainly evident in their everyday lives.
Acknowledgments I am indebted to Sean McLoughlin and Dina Afrianty for their valuable comments on
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